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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
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
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TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

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3 FEBRUARY 1971
(VOL. XXII, NO. 5)

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FBIS TRENDS

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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 25 - 31 JANUARY 1971

<u>Moscow (3788 items)</u>			<u>Peking (2731 items)</u>		
Czechoslovakia	(4%)	9%	Domestic Issues	(29%)	45%
[Leaders in USSR	(--)	6%]	Indochina	(34%)	22%
China	(4%)	5%	[PRC Foreign	(--)	4%]
Indochina	(7%)	6%	Ministry State-		
Venus 7	(--)	5%	ment, 25 Jan.		
Indian Independence	(--)	3%	UAR Delegation in	(--)	8%
Anniversary			PRC		
Venezuelan CP	(--)	3%	DPRK Airman in ROK	(--)	4%
Congress			Latin American	(8%)	3%
Angela Davis Case	(1%)	3%	Territorial Waters		
U.S. "Zionist" Anti-	(4%)	2%			
Soviet Activities					

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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INDOCHINA

The third official Hanoi protest in three weeks over "escalation" of the war in Indochina comes in a 1 February DRV Foreign Ministry statement protesting "unrestricted" use of U.S. air power throughout the area and observing that "since 30 January the United States has begun a new, extremely barbarous bombing campaign against southern Laos." Although the statement is pegged to Secretary Rogers' press conference of the 29th, it does not acknowledge that reporters pressed him regarding the possibility of imminent South Vietnamese ground action in Laos.

Speculation about ground action is noted in Hanoi comment before and after the DRV statement, however, and in a PRG Foreign Ministry statement of 2 February. The PRG statement cites press reports that the ARVN, with U.S. air support, "may soon launch an attack against communist supply routes in southern Laos" and says that "U.S. officials have not ruled out the possibility of a military operation similar to the one launched by the Americans in Cambodia last summer."

The Pathet Lao also currently releases a flurry of official statements protesting "escalation" of action against Laos, including two messages to the Geneva conference co-chairmen appealing for measures to stop the "aggressors." Radio comment on 3 February cites Western news agencies for the assertion that the Nixon Administration "has not yet revealed" that it is "sending Saigon puppet troops commanded by U.S. military advisers" to prepare for large-scale military action in the Laotian liberated zone.

The first high-level Soviet reaction to the increased U.S. support role in Cambodia and to the reports of South Vietnamese ground action in Laos comes in speeches by Premier Kosygin on occasions honoring a visiting Syrian delegation. On 1 February Kosygin declared that "an outrageous invasion of the southern provinces of Laos is under way." On the 2d, according to TASS, he said that "news reports coming in today show that the South Vietnamese puppets, on orders and with the support of their American masters, spread the military actions in southern Laos."

There has been no high-level Peking comment on Indochina since the PRC Foreign Ministry statement of the 25th. Peking has taken note of the rumored ground move into Laos, however, by publicizing a 1 February NHAN DAN editorial.

DRV PROTESTS U.S. AIR ROLE, SCORES RUMORED "INVASION" OF LAOS

While Hanoi radio and press comment beginning on 31 January began citing Western press speculation on an imminent ARVN ground

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invasion of Laos, the DRV Foreign Ministry statement on 1 February focuses instead on "unrestricted" use of U.S. air power throughout Indochina. If the pattern on Cambodia is followed, however, Hanoi can be expected to issue a separate official protest on action in Laos.*

The foreign ministry statement begins with the complaint that Secretary Rogers said in his press conference on the 29th that the United States was prepared to use its air power to the fullest extent whether in South or North Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia to protect the lives of American soldiers in South Vietnam. The statement says the United States is repeating the "deceitful allegation" about protecting U.S. lives "to prepare for new U.S. military adventures," and recalls that this was the allegation used when it sent troops to Cambodia and bombed "populated areas" in the DRV. It goes on to reiterate the standard line that if truly concerned about the lives of Americans, the Nixon Administration would not have rejected the PRG 17 September proposal, which, it says, was designed to allow U.S. withdrawal "with honor and real safety." In documenting its charge of expanded air action, the statement leads off with the assertion that "the United States has increased its aircraft carriers in the Tonkin Gulf, and since 20 January has conducted a new and very savage bombing drive in lower Laos."

On the 31st--almost exactly 24 hours before the foreign ministry statement was released--a Hanoi radio commentary in the domestic service first acknowledged Secretary Rogers' press conference remarks, in Hanoi's words, "dealing with the possibility of using U.S. air power to support the Saigon puppet troops in expanding the war of aggression to Laotian territory." It also cites AP as reporting on the 30th that "an armada of 400 U.S. combat planes, including B-52's, had fiercely attacked an area in

* On 19 January there was a DRV Foreign Ministry statement which protested "intensification" of aggression throughout Indochina, leading off with Cambodia. This was followed by a DRV Government statement on the 24th protesting the increased and more active U.S. role in Cambodia. The last DRV Foreign Ministry statement on Laos was that on 11 December which protested B-52 and other a'r strikes and the introduction of Cambodian and Thai forces, and charged that the United States "is relentlessly preparing for Saigon troops to carry out joint operations into Laos."

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southern Laos." Condemning intensified U.S. air strikes against Laos, the dispatch of Thai mercenaries, and "incursions" by ARVN troops, the commentary says that the U.S. imperialists' "new, extremely serious act of war" in Laos "unmasks Rogers' recent deceitful allegations that the United States does not want to escalate the war and will not let itself become bogged down in a land war in Cambodia or Laos."

The commentary predicts strong opposition from world and U.S. public opinion to "the U.S. rulers' plot to send Saigon puppet infantrymen to attack Laos," just as there has been to "the Nixon Administration's expansion of its strikes against the DRV and to its military activities in Cambodia."

A NHAN DAN commentary carried by VNA and broadcast by Hanoi radio earlier in the day on the 31st speaks more cryptically of possible ground action in Laos; it says that "Rogers spoke of the possibility of using the U.S. Air Force in support of South Vietnamese puppet troops' operations in Laos, but he said that the United States was unwilling to escalate the war and let itself be involved in a ground war in Cambodia or Laos." NHAN DAN precedes this with a passage that indirectly broaches the Secretary's expressions of concern regarding Vietnamese communist supplies being built up in the panhandle area of Laos. According to VNA, NHAN DAN reported Rogers as saying that "the United States would use full-scale air power everywhere in Indochina when necessary in order to check the enemy rebuilding of bases and safe shelters to threaten U.S. forces in South Vietnam."

A NHAN DAN editorial on 1 February, as reviewed by VNA, in the course of detailing escalation in Laos cites RUTTER, as reporting on the 30th that "a drive against communist supply areas in southern Laos may soon be launched by South Vietnamese ground forces backed by American air power" and that "officers also refused to rule out the possibility of an early expedition similar to the U.S. incursion against communist border sanctuaries in Cambodia last summer." Hanoi radio broadcasts a virtually identical version but in the last sentence deletes the phrase "against communist border sanctuaries." A Hanoi radio broadcast the day before also in citing Western press reports referred to the possibility of a military action in Laos "similar" to the operation in the Cambodian border area last summer but said nothing about "communist sanctuaries."

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DRV media on the 2d carry the statement by the spokesman of the delegation at the Paris conference, issued on the 1st, which echoed the foreign ministry statement in scoring stepped-up bombing in Laos. However, the spokesman went beyond the statement in citing press reports that "the Nixon Administration may be making feverish preparations for a large-scale offensive against lower Laos by Saigon puppet troops transported and supported by U.S. aircraft." A Hanoi broadcast to South Vietnam on the 3d says it is clear that it is the U.S. "aggressors" who have planned such a venture, "although to date the Nixon Administration has said nothing about the sending of Saigon puppet troops and U.S. troops to harass the liberated area in lower Laos."

RGNU STATEMENT VNA on 3 February carried the text of a statement on Indochina issued that day by a spokesman of Sihanouk's government (RGNU) which also, unlike the DRV Foreign Ministry statement, refers directly to the possibility of an invasion of Laos. It charges that "the Nixon Administration now is deploying important air and ground forces of the United States and its puppets to launch new large-scale attacks against lower Laos." Raising the spectre of a threat to the DRV, the statement adds that "alongside its continuing air raids, the Nixon Administration is preparing for new criminal adventures against the DRV."

The RGNU statement echoes the DRV Foreign Ministry statement in deploring Secretary Rogers' 29 January remark on the use of U.S. air power anywhere in Indochina to protect American forces in South Vietnam.

PRC FOREIGN MINISTRY CONDEMNS "ESCALATION" OF LAOS WAR

The DRV Foreign Ministry statement's failure to discuss rumored ground action against Laos is pointed up also by the 2 February PRG Foreign Ministry statement, which cites recent press speculation and goes so far as to say that "U.S. officials have not ruled out the possibility of a military operation similar to the one launched by the Americans in Cambodia last summer." The PRG statement begins by denouncing what it calls U.S. attempts to "escalate the special war in

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Laos" for the past several months--the bringing in of more Thai regular units and conduct of unprecedented air strikes, including the use of B-52's.*

The statement routinely charges that the Nixon Administration hopes by new "military adventures" to extricate itself from its "critical situation." The PRG Foreign Ministry expresses support for the Pathet Lao statement of 1 February denouncing U.S. "escalation," and it pledges loyalty to the unity call in the joint statement of the Indochinese people's summit conference last April.

On 30 January, the day before the release of the PRG Foreign Ministry statement, Front propaganda had charged that the United States was preparing to send South Vietnamese troops into southern Laos. A Liberation Radio commentary, for example, cited several Western news reports of evidence of an imminent attack--including the heavy air strikes in Laos and northern Quang Tri and the positioning of aircraft carriers in the Gulf of Tonkin--and added that "the situation became more serious when REUTERS reported that the South Vietnamese infantrymen . . . supported by the U.S. air force were likely to launch an offensive in southern Laos." The radio charged that Saigon troops "are now about to rush in to massacre the Laotian people" and, scoring U.S. actions throughout Indochina, declared that the United States' "new military adventures designed to expand the war throughout Indochina" will be countered.

PATHET LAO ASSAILS "AGGRESSION," APPEALS TO GENEVA CO-CHAIRMEN

The Pathet Lao currently issues a series of official statements capped by a 1 February message informing the two Geneva Conference co-chairmen of "the present extremely urgent and dangerous situation in Laos" and requesting that they take "effective measures" to deal with it. The message reports that Secretary Rogers' at his 29 January press conference did not rule out the

* A PRG Foreign Ministry statement on 14 November 1970 protested intensified B-52 bombing in Laos, charging that this was linked with "maneuvers to send Thai and Saigon puppet troops to invade Laos." A 19 November DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement on B-52 strikes did not mention such an invasion plan.

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possibility of using U.S. air power to back South Vietnamese ground forces' activities in Laos, and it calls attention to the alleged massing of "tens of thousands of U.S. troops and Saigon puppet soldiers" along the South Vietnam-Laos border "ready to enter and attack Laos." The message goes on to charge that there is in preparation a "new step of war escalation" with the "massive participation of U.S. air forces, Saigon puppet troops, and elements of the Thai army, not excluding part of the U.S. army."

This message is similar to a Central Committee "statement" which VNA carried on 1 February, stating that it had been "broadcast over Pathet Lao radio and monitored" in Hanoi. The statement encompasses U.S. actions throughout Indochina and calls upon "the peace-loving governments in the world as well as the member-countries of the 1962 Geneva Conference on Laos" to take "timely and energetic measures" against the aggressors.

During the previous week the Pathet Lao had publicized a Central Committee statement and a PLAF supreme command statement, as well as an earlier Central Committee message to the co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference. The Central Committee statement, dated 25 January and broadcast by the Pathet Lao radio on the 26th, condemned the United States for intensifying the war throughout Indochina, but particularly stressed U.S. escalation in Laos "at a time when the Lao Patriotic Front is showing its good will and exerting all-out efforts to prepare" for the plenipotentiaries' meeting. It cited "nibbling attacks by puppet troops" against the liberated zone, alleged that the United States had "dispatched additional units of Thai regular forces to Laos to undertake new military adventures," and charged the United States with increasing its bombing of Lao territory, using B-52's and spreading toxic chemicals and "causing considerable losses in lives and property to the civilian population."

The PLAF supreme command statement, broadcast by the Pathet Lao radio on 26 January, was a very similar indictment of U.S. actions throughout Indochina, again focused on U.S. support for Thai and South Vietnamese units carrying out raids in southern Laos and on escalation of U.S. bombing of Lao territory. The statement contended that the U.S. escalation "extinguishes the possibility of a peaceful settlement of the Laotian question."

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The Pathet Lao news agency on 29 January reported a Central Committee message to the Geneva conference co-chairmen, which it said was dated 24 January. Like the 1 February message to the co-chairmen, this message focused on U.S. activities in Laos, omitting the broader comment on Indochina which was included in the virtually concurrent Central Committee statement.

SOUPHANOUVONG
EMISSARY

Pathet Lao radio on 3 February reported a press conference held the day before by Souphanouvong's special envoy Tiao Souk Vongsak which dealt with Souvanna Phouma's 21 January proposal that the long-sought plenipotentiaries' meeting be held in Luang Prabang rather than Khang Khay.* Souk said that since Khang Khay had been selected as the meeting site "and jointly agreed upon, both sides should seek ways to ensure security for the meeting." Expressing the view that Souvanna's proposal "will obstruct rather than advance preparations for the meeting," Souk recalled "our most generous proposal of 31 December 1970 on security for the Khang Khay meeting" and charged that preparations for that meeting "are deadlocked because of the destructive acts of the U.S. imperialists and their rightist stooges." Souk added, however, that he "remains Prince Souphanouvong's special envoy" and that he is "ready to continue discussions with Prince Souvanna Phouma successfully to push forward preparations for the Khang Khay meeting." He told the journalists that "when I am about to leave for Vientiane again, I will surely notify reporters."

Souvanna's proposal had first been acknowledged on 29 January by the Pathet Lao radio, which suggested that Souvanna was pressured into the proposal by "the United States and its henchmen" who "obviously want to annul the agreement to choose Khang Khay as site of the meeting." It charged that the proposal "is aimed at bringing pressure to bear" and "to shift the blame" if the meeting fails to take place. It further asserted that until the United States ceases its pressure on Souvanna and its sabotage of the talks, "it is impossible to convene any conference at any place, and even if a meeting is held it cannot yield any positive result."

* Souvanna's 21 January proposal and Souk's return to Sam Neua are discussed in the TRENDS of 27 January, page 14.

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A 1 February NLHS Central Committee communique on Souk's report to Souphanouvong and the NLHS Central Committee on his discussions with Souvanna did not comment on the substance of those discussions but noted that Souphanouvong gave "new advice" to Souk, who "will return to Vientiane again to continue his duty on preparations for the Khang Khay meeting."

KOSYGIN, TASS CHARGE U.S. ESCALATION, INTRUSION INTO LAOS

The first elite Soviet comment on the increased U.S. support role in Cambodia and the possibility of allied action in Laos came in remarks by Premier Kosygin at a dinner and luncheon honoring a visiting Syrian delegation. According to TASS, Kosygin said on 1 February that "the Soviet Government could not help giving serious attention to the further aggravation of the situation in Indochina, where American imperialism is expanding, with the help of its Saigon hirelings, the military operations against Cambodia; where an outrageous invasion of the southern provinces of Laos is under way and where the gross violation of the sovereignty of the DRV is continuing."

In contrast to this careful avoidance of any mention of a U.S. role in an "invasion" of Laos, Kosygin declared in his remarks the next day, also reported by TASS, that "new reports coming in today show that the South Vietnamese puppets on orders and with the support of their American masters spread the military action in southern Laos." In an obvious effort to marshal public opinion against any allied action in Laos, Kosygin said that "the peaceful public of the whole world protests angrily against this new American adventure."

On the 3d TASS issued a statement which begins by saying that the Soviet Union "strongly denounces the armed intrusion of the United States and Saigon puppets into Laos." But it goes on to declare, in language more cautious than Kosygin's: "reports say that a considerable number of Saigon ground troops supported by U.S. armed forces invaded Laos" and that U.S. B-52's have been making daily raids. The statement adds that "new aggressive actions from the United States will cause further and serious complications of the situation in Indochina" and that these actions "jeopardize the contacts that have been established between the political forces of Laos with the aim of seeking a peace settlement for that country."

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Like Kosygin, the statement calls in standard terms for a political settlement of the Indochina conflict. It concludes with a generalized expression of support for the struggle of the Indochinese peoples and with an expression of confidence that they will be able to repulse "the invader" in that "part of the world."

Earlier Moscow propaganda included an article by Ilinskiy on 2 February entitled "The Cynicism of the Aggressor," which charged that "large groups of military units of the Saigon regime under the command of American officers" have "penetrated" Laos. It added that "the U.S. Air Force conducts over 700 flights daily against areas controlled by the Laotian patriotic forces, and there are more than 12,000 U.S. 'advisers' already stationed in that country." The "Soviet people," Ilinskiy added vaguely, "side with the just cause of the Laotian patriots and express the conviction that Laos will be a truly independent and free, peaceful and democratic, united and neutral state."

A commentary by Radio Moscow's Godunov broadcast to foreign audiences on 1 February cited Western news reports as confirming that "Saigon forces with U.S. air support are waging a vast aggression against Laos." Without mentioning the Soviet role as a Geneva conference co-chairman, Godunov sought to exploit the new "escalation" by noting that "the United States signed the 1962 treaty on Laos which called for respect for the country's sovereignty, independence, and neutrality."

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DRV, FRONT DECRY U.S. STATEMENTS ON INVOLVEMENT IN CAMBODIA

Hanoi and Front comment on Cambodia takes note of statements on the war by U.S. officials, citing remarks by Administration spokesmen and others to demonstrate the expansion of "U.S. aggression" there and quoting congressional criticism of Administration policies. Comment highlights Secretary Roger's 29 January press conference statement that the United States would use unlimited air power throughout Indochina, and also cites Secretary Laird's testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on 27 January. The 31 January NHAN DAN commentary, for example, scores Laird for declaring that "U.S. involvement in Cambodia not only aimed at protecting its troops in South Vietnam but at helping the Phnom Penh regime to resist 'communist aggression' and that Congress did not ban" the use in Cambodia of U.S. personnel for equipment delivery, search and rescue, and information and medical activities. According to the VNA version, NHAN DAN comments that "the Nixon clique has gone beyond its previous claims of 'abolishing the sanctuary of the VC,' 'protecting American lives in South Vietnam,' and 'insuring the American troops' pull-out.'"

A 29 January Hanoi domestic broadcast noted that Chairman of the Armed Services Committee Stennis on the 27th "impudently" remarked that the United States might feel compelled to go further in its involvement by introducing air controllers. The NHAN DAN commentary on the 31st does not mention this aspect of the Senator's remarks but responds to a reference he made to DRV troops in Cambodia, declaring that his "open slander against the DRV cannot smear the Cambodian people's struggle and undermine the solidarity between the Vietnamese and Khmer people."

Both Hanoi and Front media pick up Western news reports of U.S. military personnel in Cambodia. A Liberation Radio commentary on the 31st, for example, charges that "despite the fact that the U.S. Congress prohibits Nixon from sending U.S. military advisers and troops to Cambodia, he has, in fact, ignored the congressional ban and has surreptitiously sent U.S. military advisers to Cambodia."

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DRV PROTESTS U.S. BOMBING IN DEMILITARIZED ZONE, QUANG BINH

A DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement on 30 January, released that day by DRV media, scores alleged U.S. air raids on the northern part of the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and Quang Binh Province. The protest charges that for five days, from 25 to 29 January, the United States "sent several types of aircraft, including B-52's, to drop many demolition and steel-pellet bombs onto Huong Lap village, north of the 17th parallel in the DMZ." And it claims that on 27 January, U.S. aircraft "indiscriminately bombed a number of localities in Quang Binh Province."

The spokesman "severely condemned these acts of war" and "resolutely demanded that the U.S. authorities cease forthwith all encroachments" on the DRV's sovereignty and security.

SOUTH SUPPORT FOR NORTH An LPA commentary on 1 February, which is carried by both LPA and Liberation Radio that day, scores the United States for the alleged bombings in late January. It routinely warns that "no insolent threat by the U.S. imperialists against the North will escape due punishment by the South Vietnamese people." It repeats the familiar threat that every "war act" by the United States against the North will be punished by the South Vietnamese people and armed forces "five and ten times harder."

On 28 January Liberation Radio broadcasts the latter portion of the 14 December 1970 NFLSV-PRG statement issued in response to the appeal of the VWP-DRV Government on 10 December, without identifying it. The rebroadcast portion affirms that "Vietnam is one" and reiterates the resolve of the southern people to fight until "complete victory." It says that the South Vietnamese armed forces and people "are resolved not to tolerate any U.S. military adventures against the DRV or any U.S. crimes against the kith-and-kin northern compatriots."

FRONT SAYS ALLIES VIOLATE TET TRUCE, SCORES U MINH OPERATIONS

CEASE-FIRE "VIOLATIONS" Front media predictably charge that the allies violated the communists' order for a four-day (26-30 January) cease-fire over Tet, the lunar new year; and VNA on the 2d cites LPA figures claiming a total of 840 violations. A Liberation Radio commentary on the 30th

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listed alleged allied acts breaking the truce and commented that "these acts are stunning slaps at the U.S.-puppets who have repeatedly ballyhooed about the so-called 'good will for peace,' 'extended cease-fire,' 'in-place truce,' and so forth; no one can believe their deceitful words." According to this and other broadcasts, "many" Saigon troops refused to carry out orders and demanded to return home over the holiday. Communist propaganda prior to Tet had urged government troops to carry out such actions.

U MINH The 30 January commentary and other Liberation Radio
FIGHTING reports of alleged cease-fire violations describe as
 "particularly serious" allied activity in the U Minh
area--the site since November of South Vietnamese operations to
clear the long-time communist stronghold in Kien Giang and An
Xuyen provinces. Allied operations in the U Minh area have been
followed in Hanoi and Front propaganda, with battle reports in
December and early January claiming that the communists success-
fully attacked the participating GVN units. A 27 December
Liberation Radio broadcast, for example, compared the operations
to attempted allied sweeps in the same area in 1968 and 1969
and claimed that the current plan to pacify the area had been
"initially defeated" and that the insurgents were "determined
to completely defeat the U.S.-puppet nibbling and pacification
operations." It alleged that the allied forces in the operation
had suffered some 2,000 casualties in 15 days.

NORTH VIETNAMESE LEADERS MAKE ANNUAL TET VISITS

A succession of VNA items from 28 to 31 January report the visits of DRV leaders President Ton Duc Thang, Le Duan, Vo Nguyen Giap, Le Duc Tho, Nguyen Duy Trinh and Hoang Van Hoan to various units of the People's Armed Forces, to factories and cooperatives, to families of workers and cadres, and to South Vietnam's Special Representation to the DRV. Other leaders making similar visits included To Huu, Nguyen Van Tran, Do Muoi, and Song Hao. Visits to various localities and army units on the occasion of Tet last year were reported to have been made by President Ton Duc Thang, Le Duan, Truong Chinh, Vo Nguyen Giap, Nguyen Duy Trinh and Le Thanh Nghi. Although Truong Chinh apparently made no visits during Tet this year he did attend the annual Fatherland Front Central Committee meeting--held on 26 January this year--as he did last year.*

* See the TRENDS of 27 January 1971, page 13, and of 11 February 1970, pages 6 and 7.

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PRC CITES SWEDISH PRESS ON POSSIBLE U.S. USE OF A-WEAPONS

In an unusual discussion of possible U.S. use of nuclear weapons in Indochina, a Stockholm-dated NCNA report on 29 January quoted the Swedish paper /FTONBLADET as saying the day before that the Nixon Administration "will probably use a new-type atomic bomb of 'limited' power" for "a decisive battle" in Indochina. The account cited "many indications" that Washington is approaching the stage of decision, including an article in the New York TIMES in November by C. L. Sulzberger and similar reports in other papers serving as trial balloons for the White House to test public opinion. It also cited "the forced removal of 3.5 million South Vietnamese from the north to the south" as another indication that the United States is preparing to use atomic weapons.*

Peking's standard reference to nuclear weapons in Indochina is that the United States has used a wide range of tactics and weapons short of nuclear arms, with no indication that Washington intends to cross this threshold. The atypical 29 January NCNA report claimed that from 1966 to 1968 the United States had discussed the question of using tactical nuclear weapons in Vietnam but was deterred by "the vigorous opposition" of international opinion. In addition to serving Peking's general propaganda interest in exploiting opposition to U.S. policy, the NCNA report, which has been broadcast to foreign and domestic audiences, may have been designed to promote adverse world opinion to any use of nuclear weapons in Indochina. NCNA quoted the Swedish paper as saying that "many well-informed U.S. scientists and politicians feel quite uneasy about the matter" and that "some representatives of these politicians" made contacts with political figures in other Western countries "so as to arouse international opinion to stop this crazy act."

* The first known communist reference to speculation about the possible removal of large numbers of people from the northern provinces in South Vietnam was in the 20 January PRG Foreign Ministry statement. The "scheme" is currently mentioned in the 1 February NHAN DAN editorial on U.S. "escalation" in Indochina.

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MIDDLE EAST

Moscow in the past few weeks has given meager propaganda attention to the Middle East situation. But Kosygin takes the occasion of the Moscow visit of a Syrian party-government delegation led by Prime Minister and Defense Minister Hafiz al-Asad to underscore Soviet insistence on implementation of Security Council Resolution 242. Calling this a "crucial moment" in Middle East developments, Kosygin refers to the Jarring talks and looks to Israel for "concrete, peaceful actions." He makes no mention of the cease-fire expiration on 5 February, which is virtually ignored in the propaganda. Nor does Moscow express any opinion on the usefulness of a Security Council meeting or Big Four initiatives to obtain an extension of the cease-fire or otherwise assist Jarring in his negotiations. Limited comment again plays up Cairo's desire for a peaceful solution while portraying Israel as engaging in delaying tactics in the hope of prolonging its occupation of the Arab territories.

KOSYGIN SEES RESOLUTION 242 AS "REALISTIC" WAY TO PEACE

Speaking at a 1 February dinner for the Syrian delegation, Kosygin expresses Soviet conviction that the November 1967 Security Council resolution--never endorsed by Syria--is the "most realistic road" to a solution of the Middle East crisis. Without mentioning the resolution, he tells the Syrians in a luncheon speech the following day that it is necessary to "maintain realism" in appraising the situation, as well as "vigilance toward the enemy." In his speech on the 1st, he does not go on to cite portions of the resolution, as he did in his 21 December speech during the visit of a UAR delegation led by 'Ali Sabri. He merely adds that due account must be taken of the lawful rights of "all" the Middle Eastern states, including the Arab people of Palestine. Nor does he explicitly call for Israeli withdrawal, although he does routinely charge Israel with endeavoring to remain in the occupied territories. To the peoples of the Middle East, he says, such a policy bars prospects of "peaceful development and cooperation." He later remarks that given a desire for peace under conditions when "all the peoples of

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the Middle East" could live as "good neighbors," one should be guided not by the ideas of "extremist politicians" but by the vital interests of the peoples.*

Kosygin sees the Middle East crisis as involving "grave international complications," and says that a "crucial moment" has been reached in Middle East developments. Israel, he says, agreed to resume contacts with Jarring under pressure of world public opinion, "as a result of the constructive policy" of the UAR. In line with general propaganda reticence, he makes no mention of the expiration of the ceasefire on 5 February. He cautions that "further procrastinations, attempts to bargain from positions of raw force," will not lead to a solution. (In December he had specifically advised the "Israeli extremists" to be under no illusion that through bargaining they would be able to get a price for their consent to a peaceful settlement.) He puts the next step up to Israel: Everyone, he says, is now looking to Israel for "concrete peaceful actions."

Again pledging "all-round" support to the Arab cause, Kosygin says the USSR is developing cooperation with friendly Arab states, giving them "all necessary support," and assures the Syrians that this applies "in full measure" to Syrian-Soviet relations. Concluding with a pro forma appeal for Arab unity, he welcomes the efforts of the UAR, Syria, Sudan, and Libya--the "Tripoli Charter" states--to strengthen their united actions in the struggle against imperialism, which he claims is counting on Arab disunity and is trying to delay "elimination of the consequences of the aggression." He nowhere directly mentions the United States, referring only to Israel's reliance on the "forces of imperialism and reaction"; in December he had alluded to Israel's "patrons."

* The "good neighbor" concept has appeared infrequently in the propaganda: The first appearance seems to have been a Kudryavtsev article in IZVESTIYA last August which recalled the language of Resolution 242 on frontiers and added that frontiers would become safe and recognized under conditions of "peace, cooperation, and good neighborliness." The 3 December statement of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee said that without Israeli withdrawal it was impossible to imagine the peoples of the Middle East living like good neighbors.

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USSR PRAISES UAR'S EFFORTS FOR PEACE, RETICENT ON CEASE-FIRE

Moscow In the past three weeks has kept its propaganda on the Middle East to a minimum.* Typifying the approach, a panelist on the 24 January domestic service commentators' roundtable noted that negotiations were under way through Jarring and the sides had defined their positions, but he declined to anticipate the results of Jarring's efforts.

TASS has reported the UAR and Jordanian memorandums to Jarring, made public by the respective governments, summarizing the UAR memorandum conveyed to Jarring on 15 January and giving a brief account of the Jordanian statement delivered to him on the 18th. On the 27th a TASS dispatch from New York noted that Israel had conveyed to Jarring its reply to the "latest proposals" by the UAR and Jordan, and that this "rounds out the first stage" of the contacts. Pointing out that Israel's reply was made orally, TASS said this evoked a cautious response from "local observers," who suppose the Israeli Government has not given up its tactics of "deliberate procrastinations."

On 2 February TASS carried a short report of the UAR memorandum presented to Jarring on the 1st, noting that it again outlines the UAR's "firm position" on a peace settlement proceeding from its readiness to fulfill all provisions of Resolution 242. On the same day, a brief TASS account of U Thant's report to the Security Council on Jarring's activities said he appealed for a continued cease-fire and asked the parties to continue their contacts. The report indicates, TASS said, that the course of the contacts gave ground "for 'cautious optimism.'" It added that U Thant urged the parties to pursue their discussions in a constructive manner and cooperate with Jarring with a view to carrying out Resolution 242, and to withhold fire, exercise military restraint, and maintain the quiet. A statement by the UAR's UN representative az-Zayyat is reported by TASS on the 3d as having said U Thant's appeal to refrain from firing is one of the elements "which will be taken into consideration." At the same time, TASS said, az-Zayyat

* Comment on the Middle East in the week ending 31 January accounted for only 0.7% of total comment, the lowest figure since mid-June 1969.

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emphasized that peace is incompatible with military occupation and stressed the responsibility of the Security Council, its permanent members, and all UN members for bringing about peace in the Middle East.

PRESS COMMENT Moscow's limited comment on the UAR's 15 January memorandum lauds Cairo's "extremely constructive position" and its "peaceful aspirations," Koryavin declaring in the 29 January IZVESTIYA, according to TASS, that the memorandum's demands for an end to the "Israeli aggression" and for withdrawal beyond the 5 June 1967 frontiers are "absolutely just." And Vasilyev, in the 29 January PRAVDA, asserted that from the very first contacts with Jarring Cairo has demonstrated its good will and sincere efforts for a political solution. The UAR memorandum, he said, adheres strictly to Resolution 242. Summing up the UAR's six points for a settlement, Vasilyev said the proposals, put forward in "a calm and positive spirit," open the way to establishment of a just and lasting peace permitting every state in the area to live in security.

Both Koryavin and Vasilyev complain of Israel's attitude, the former holding Israel's "obstructionist policy" responsible for hampering settlement of the crisis while the latter complains that Israel, trying to prolong its occupation while addressing threats to the Arab countries, is endeavoring to dictate its conditions from a position of strength. Criticizing the United States as well as Israel, an Arabic-language commentary on the 26th assailed Washington for its "active participation with Tel Aviv in maneuvers" about Jarring's mission. Trying to justify Israel's stand, it declared, the United States "tacitly approves" Israel's attempts to tie its participation in the Jarring contacts with "groundless conditions and demands." The State Department, it added, made it clear the United States supports the Israeli position with regard to withdrawal and not the demand of Resolution 242.

ROGERS REMARKS Reporting Secretary Rogers' 29 January press conference, TASS on the 30th singled out his expression of hope that the cease-fire agreement would be extended as a result of the activities of Jarring and U Thant, and his remark that the United States "was 'working quietly behind the scenes.'" TASS juxtaposed the observation that Israeli Finance Minister Sapir recently asked for a new U.S. loan of \$500 million, and commented that satisfaction of this request at the present time and further deliveries of American arms could only encourage Tel Aviv to sabotage a peaceful settlement.

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TASS on 23 January had reported UAR Foreign Minister Riyad as saying, in reply to a message from Secretary Rogers, that the UAR so far saw no progress in the Jarring mission. TASS cited the Cairo AL-AHRAM to the effect that the Secretary had pointed out in his message that extension of the cease-fire agreement would substantially contribute to the Jarring mission, and that Washington preferred not to raise the Middle East problem in the Security Council.

SYRIANS HAVE "FRUITFUL EXCHANGE OF OPINIONS" IN MOSCOW

TASS on 29 January announced that "in accordance with an agreement reached earlier," a Syrian party-government delegation would visit Moscow early in February; the delegation, led by Prime Minister and Defense Minister Hafiz al-Asad, member of the Ba'th Provisional Regional Command, arrived in Moscow on 1 February. This is the first high-level visit since al-Asad's takeover of power in mid-November last year. Al-Asad had been a member of the last such official Syrian delegation to Moscow, led by the then chief of state al-Atasi. This visit, originally scheduled for May 1969 and then postponed--reportedly by the Soviet side--took place in early July that year.*

Moscow reports on the two days of talks--the delegation left on 3 February--characterize the atmosphere as one of "friendship and frankness," TASS reporting on the 1st that a "fruitful exchange of opinions" on bilateral relations and international problems took place that day. In addition to Brezhnev, Podgornyy, and Kosygin, TASS reported that the Soviet side included Ponomarev, Baybakov, Gromyko, Grechko, and Patolichev. The Syrian delegation included the ministers of foreign affairs, agriculture, economy and external trade, petroleum, and Euphrates dam. Damascus radio on the 1st added that "several technicians and civilian and military experts" accompanied the delegation.

In his speech on 1 February Kosygin said the negotiations which had begun confirm the "proximity of views on key questions" of the international situation and point to possibilities of further

* See the FBIS TRENDS of 3 July 1969, pages 1-6.

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developing Syrian-Soviet cooperation. The USSR, he said, values this cooperation not only as regards bilateral relations but also as a factor in helping consolidate peace in the Middle East. And he added that questions connected with this situation "naturally" would hold an important place in the negotiations. Affirming the "cordial relations" between the USSR and Syria, Kosygin rejected "imperialist propaganda" claims that these relations are the result of "temporary protective conditions" or are based on "commercial interests" in the Middle East. They are founded, he maintained, on common interests in the anti-imperialist struggle.

CPSU-BA'TH Speaking at a luncheon given by the Syrians
RELATIONS on 2 February, Kosygin said, according to
 TASS, that the Soviet Union "attaches great
importance" to friendly CPSU-Syrian Ba'th contacts, which
help strengthen friendly relations between the Soviet and
Syrian peoples and play an "important role" in supporting
the struggle for national independence, peace, and social
progress. The same day TASS reported that al-Asad was
received by Brezhnev for a conversation "in a warm and heart-
felt atmosphere" during which they discussed some international
issues as well as questions concerning CPSU-Ba'th contacts.

Treatment of communiques on past CPSU-Syrian Ba'th talks has pointed up Soviet-Syrian differences: Thus the communique on talks in Moscow in January 1967 was inexplicably delayed until 11 February, and that on talks in Damascus in July-August 1968 was significantly published by PRAVDA only in summary form, omitting such passages--in the Damascus version--as an expression of Soviet support for the Arab right to "use every means available" in the struggle to end Israeli occupation. Lower-level party contacts have continued, with little publicity from Damascus and apparently even less from Moscow. For example, according to brief reports from Damascus, Ba'th delegations visited Moscow in December 1969 and February 1970, and CPSU delegations were in Syria in March and April last year.

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GERMANY AND BERLIN

GDR DENOUNCES, USSR QUESTIONS FRG ACTIVITIES IN WEST BERLIN

The late-January visits and meetings of FRG officials and political leaders in West Berlin, particularly the 27-30 January meeting of FDP parliamentary leaders, prompted strong denunciations in GDR official statements and followup propaganda, while Moscow used routine propaganda channels to impugn Bonn's policy toward West Berlin. The propaganda served as accompaniment to the GDR authorities' five-day slowdown of civilian traffic on the autobahns linking the Federal Republic with West Berlin--longer in duration than the slowdowns occasioned by the CDU/CSU parliamentary meeting in the city in November (four days) and the SPD parliamentary meeting in December (three days). As usual, the propaganda did not specifically acknowledge the slowdowns.

GDR media on 24 January publicized the customary foreign ministry spokesman's statement protesting the impending FDP meeting and denouncing FRG activities in West Berlin generally. To date Soviet media have not been heard to mention the protest made by the Soviet embassy to the three Western embassies in West Berlin on the 27th, though it was cited obliquely in an East Berlin radio commentary on 1 February.

GDR PROTEST, COMMENTARIES The GDR Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement of 24 January reacted both to the projected FDP parliamentary leaders' meeting, with the participation of FRG Federal Ministers Genscher and Ertl, and to the concurrent visits to West Berlin of President Heinemann and Chancellor Brandt "in their official capacities." The statement complained, in the vein of prior protests against FRG meetings in the city, that Bonn's actions "violate the status of West Berlin, which does not belong to the FRG," and serve only to "create new fuel for conflict in the heart of Europe" and to "hamper the efforts to bring about detente." Reported by ADN on the 24th and published in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND the next day, the statement further labeled these actions "interference" running counter to international law and conflicting with the FRG's "official assurances" that it wants to help achieve "settlements regarding West Berlin." The spokesman made his statement two days before the scheduled fourth meeting between GDR and FRG State Secretaries Bahr and Kohl in East Berlin.

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The spokesman concluded routinely that it is in the interests of the Federal Government and "not least" of the people of West Berlin to "respect the status of West Berlin and to terminate the unlawful political demonstration in that city." This standard line recurs in commentaries pegged directly to the FRG activities in West Berlin, to the CSU congress in Duesseldorf, and to Brandt's 28 January State of the Nation address. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND also picked up TASS and Soviet central press criticisms of the FRG activities.

PROPAGANDA TASS' 25 January report of the GDR Foreign
FROM MOSCOW Ministry spokesman's protest, based on ADN's
report, appeared in the 27 January PRAVDA
alongside a brief dispatch from the paper's special correspon-
dent in West Berlin, Khodakovskiy, noting that Heinemann was
to leave for West Berlin on the 27th and commenting that this
was "only the beginning" of FRG actions "aimed at undermining
the status of West Berlin and at obstructing the attainment
of an agreement on problems of West Berlin." The report of
the protest and the dispatch appeared under the single headline
"Illegal Actions."

Also on the 25th, TASS summarized an ADN report of that date on a meeting between Ulbricht and West German Communist Party (DKP) Chairman Bachmann noting, among other things, the two party leaders' denunciations of FRG activity in West Berlin. But TASS left out a passage which said the two sides "condemned" Bonn's "attempts to misuse West Berlin as the spearhead against the GDR and the socialist camp"--a formula that does not fit with Moscow's current approach, centered on criticism of elements in the FRG bent on blocking a West Berlin settlement and achieving European detente.

On the 27th, Radio Moscow told German listeners that the PRG's projected "illegal actions" constituted an attempt to change the status of West Berlin. Observing that the "escalation of political activity" by Bonn "in a city which does not belong to the Bonn state and is not subject to its administration" is continuing, the commentary added--in an apparent allusion to the traffic slowdown which had started that day--that Western politicians "seem not to know that pressure creates counterpressure." It went on to ask rhetorically if the FDP and SPD leaderships were now espousing the CDU policy of an "imperial neurosis"--a policy of "illusionists ignoring realities." While reiterating Soviet approval of past steps taken under Brandt's "peace policy," the commentator complained that Bonn "intentionally refuses" to ratify the Moscow

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and Warsaw treaties, which also means that Bonn's "peace policy . . . will not be implemented." And the growing FRG "illegal political activity in West Berlin" and "lack of realism" on the part of West German politicians regarding a Berlin settlement "must inevitably impede and disturb the achievement of an agreement on the West Berlin problems."

While Soviet media have not publicized the USSR Embassy protest to the Big Three embassies on the 27th, which placed the onus for "undesirable results" of the FDP meeting on its organizers but did not mention the Heinemann or Brandt visits, routine Soviet comment has cited Heinemann's and Brandt's visits as well as the FDP meeting as "illegal political activity" which "cannot facilitate" a West Berlin settlement. The most authoritative Soviet comment comes from PRAVDA's foreign political observer Viktor Mayevskiy in an article on 31 January, which denounces Bonn's "incessant attempts . . . to undermine the status of West Berlin, to hinder the reaching of an agreement on West Berlin problems."

An apparent allusion to the Soviet official protest appeared in an East Berlin radio commentary on 1 February. The radio's Moscow correspondent Seibold noted that the Soviet Union had made its views on West Berlin known via its central press, TASS, and "official channels," but did not elaborate on the latter. Seibold went on instead to recall the formulation in Brezhnev's November Yerevan speech--used again by Kosygin in his year-end ASAHI interview--to the effect that the "Berlin problem, while difficult to solve, can be solved given the good will of all concerned" and if the interests of the West Berliners and the "legitimate interests and sovereign rights" of the GDR are accommodated. It is on this basis that the Soviet Union is negotiating with the three Western powers, the GDR correspondent said, and the "difficult" talks should not be "further complicated" now by "extra obstacles"--that is, Bonn's "massive, organized" and "deliberate" interference in West Berlin.

BRANDT SPEECH, Brandt's State of the Nation address to the
CDU CONGRESS Bundestag on 28 January elicited typically
abusive denunciations from East Berlin and
relatively low-keyed comment from Moscow. Noting that the three
main subjects of Brandt's speech were the Ostpolitik, FRG-GDR
relations, and the talks on West Berlin, TASS on the 29th
remarked without further comment that Brandt had made ratification
of the Moscow and Warsaw treaties "conditional" on the
"positive results" of the four-power talks on West Berlin. TASS
added that Brandt thoroughly discussed FRG-GDR relations but that
he made no reference to recognition of the GDR under international
law.

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Soviet propaganda reacted more harshly to the CDU/CSU speech of reply, delivered by Bundestag Opposition leader Barzel, and to speeches in the ensuing two-day debate on 28-29 January. TASS discerned an "attempt to interfere" in the GDR's internal affairs in Barzel's statement that there must be "progress inside Germany" before the Moscow treaty can be ratified. Such "attempts" had "previously proved bankrupt many times," TASS remarked. In a similar vein, Moscow comment on the 25-27 January CDU congress in Duesseldorf charged that the CDU leadership "intends to continue to follow the blind alley course initiated by Adenauer" in the interests of the "revanchist circles of West German capital" (Mayevskiy in PRAVDA on the 31st).

At the same time Moscow has continued to note the presence in the CDU of forces which now "realize the need" for a "realistic policy" in Europe. Soviet media had given considerable publicity to the 13-20 January visit of Gerhard Schroeder, chairman of the Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee and deputy chairman of the CDU, invited to the USSR by Chairman of the Council of Union Shitikov. TASS and the central press reported Schroeder's talks with leading Soviet officials, including Gromyko and Kosygin, on "urgent problems in relations between the USSR and the FRG."

Moscow carried a fairly brief, straightforward report of Ulbricht's 28 January speech to the 15th SED Central Committee plenum on political preparations for the party's forthcoming eighth congress. In the speech, delivered the same day as Brandt's State of the Nation address, the East German leader did not mention the Bahr-Kohl talks, the four-power talks, or Berlin but took the occasion to again strongly denounce any kind of special "intra-German relations" and to demand that Bonn abandon its "dreams of 'intra-German relations', with their aura of tutelage." Ulbricht reiterated the GDR's policy of "relations of peaceful coexistence, of contractually agreed normal diplomatic relations on the basis of international law." East German commentaries, sharply critical of Brandt's speech as constituting "interference" in GDR internal affairs, insisted that the "German socialist state" is irrevocably delimited and entirely separate from the "imperialist" FRG.

PATTERN BEGINS TO EMERGE IN BAHR-KOHL DISCUSSIONS

The current series of discussions between State Secretaries Bahr of the FRG and Kohl of the GDR show signs of setting into a pattern regarding venue and frequency. The first two meetings on 27 November and 23 December, 26 days apart, were held in East Berlin. The third

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meeting, 23 days later on 15 January, was held in Bonn. The communique on that meeting for the first time announced a pre-arranged date and time for the next one, 26 January in Berlin--a development noted by Brandt in his State of the Nation address as a healthy indicator that the Bahr-Kohl discussions have "lost their initial quasi-sensational coloring."

The communique on the fourth meeting on 26 January followed suit in announcing a time and place for the fifth one--4 February in Bonn, sustaining the pattern of alternating sites. On 2 February, East and West German media announced that the date had been pushed ahead to the 3d. The communique on the 3 February meeting, postdating the traffic slowdowns on the autobahns, says Bahr and Kohl will meet next in Berlin on 17 February.

GDR media continue to avoid detailing the substance of the talks. ADN has consistently limited itself to the same three- or four-line announcements DPA identifies as "communiques," but without so designating them. It has at no time carried any elaboration, in contrast to DPA's more extensive reporting, and it has ignored all the comments on the talks by the FRG official spokesmen at press briefings.

While ignoring Western speculation that at the 26 January meeting Bahr and Kohl would for the first time expand their agenda beyond the Berlin problem to postal connections, ADN announced on the eve of the meeting that "telecommunications between the GDR and the independent political entity of West Berlin" would be expanded on 31 January by the addition of a number of direct telephone lines "between the GDR and West Berlin." The wording of the announcement seemed calculated to stress that the agreement was between the GDR and West Berlin--not West German--officials.

SED Politburo member Axen referred to the Bahr-Kohl talks in his Politburo report to the SED Central Committee plenum on 28 January, carried in full in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND on the 29th, as a product of GDR initiative. Axen recalled that on 29 October 1970 the East German Government had proposed to the FRG that the two states enter into negotiations "in due and proper form on concluding a treaty regulating the mutual transit of persons and goods of the GDR and the FRG." He pointed out that such a treaty, valid under international law, would "promote successful progress" of the four-power talks on West Berlin. Axen used the word "Vertrag" (treaty) where Ulbricht had used the apparently less formal term "Abkommen" (agreement) in the same context in his New Year's address. Axen concluded his remarks on the Bahr-Kohl talks by stating that Ulbricht had outlined the GDR position on them "clearly and unmistakably."

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POLAND

MOSCOW SCORES "LIES" ABOUT PLAN TO INVADE POLAND

Western press speculation about a possible Soviet invasion of Poland draws a vehement Soviet propaganda reaction reflecting Moscow's evident touchiness on the subject. Under the title "Breeders of Lies," an article by Mikhailov in the 30 January PRAVDA singles out a UPI report "about Russia's alleged intention to invade Poland" as "another foul maneuver," a "flagrant lie" propagated by the "capitalist" and "yellow" press in the United States, then "passed across the Atlantic" and spread further by the West European press. The article acknowledges what may well be at the crux of Moscow's vehement reaction in noting that the "fabrication" was also picked up and disseminated by Radio Free Europe, "broadcasting to Poland and other socialist countries."

The article claims that in fact, according to "reports from Poland," the difficulties of last December "are now being successfully overcome" and that the Polish working people "have acknowledged with gratitude" the manifestations of solidarity by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. Mikhailov cites the visit of First Secretary Gierek and Premier Jaroszewicz to Moscow on 5 January as evidence of deepening Polish-Soviet cooperation. He declares that the efforts of "imperialist subversive centers" to exploit the "temporary" Polish difficulties have failed and expresses the conviction that the "flagrant lies" about a projected invasion "will not deceive world public opinion."

Mikhailov's article has been summarized at some length by TASS for recipients abroad but has not so far been broadcast to foreign or domestic radio audiences. Chinese charges had elicited Moscow's only prior comment on the question of possible Soviet military intervention in Poland--the 31 December PRAVDA editorial article which derided Peking's claim that the Soviets had moved troops to the Polish border during the mid-December disturbances. The editorial article, which countercharged Peking with "impudent interference" in Poland's internal affairs, was summarized widely by Radio Moscow for audiences including the Poles.

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WARSAW, PRAGUE PICKUPS
OF MIKHAILOV'S ARTICLE

The Warsaw domestic radio summarized Mikhailov's article on 30 January but carefully suppressed its principal point, presenting it blandly as "a commentary devoted to the situation in Poland" which emphasized Soviet solidarity with the Poles in overcoming their "temporary" difficulties. Warsaw's summary cited Mikhailov's assertion that "imperialist lies" and "unfounded inventions" would not deceive world opinion, but it did not indicate the substance of the "lies." The summary nowhere mentioned that the article specifically denied Western speculation about a possible invasion.

By contrast, a report on the 30th in the Prague domestic service highlighted the most polemical features of the PRAVDA article, noting at the outset that it described a UPI report "that the Soviet Union is prepared to invade Poland as a new dirty maneuver and an impertinent lie."

CZECHOSLOVAKIA, HUNGARY LEAD IN COMMENT ON POLISH EVENTS

While Moscow's comment on the Polish scene continues to be sporadic, Czechoslovakia has originated extensive comment drawing heavily on the new Polish leaders' own statements, most recently on the impermissibility of irresponsible breaches of discipline. Hungary, second to Czechoslovakia in the volume of its propaganda attention to the Polish events, has sought to minimize potential dangers to "socialist" interests in the Polish situation. In what seems a replay of Budapest's approach at the time of the 1968 events in Czechoslovakia, current Hungarian comment--in a period of restiveness among the Polish workers which has generated new tensions between the new leadership and the Soviets--is at pains to picture a calm situation held well under control by the regime.

Bucharest, cautiously reticent, has originated no comment on Poland since 27 December when a SCINTEIA article emphasized a return to normalcy there; as the signs of unrest and assertiveness among the Polish workers mounted in January, Bucharest's infrequent news reports largely steered clear of the internal situation. Sofia, on the other hand, has carried reports in late January suggesting a deteriorating situation and has referred for the first time to basic "problems." But Bulgaria has originated no comment at all.

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Sparse comment and reportage from East Germany has attacked RFE, insisted that Polish-GDR relations would remain intact, and approvingly cited a member of the new Polish regime on the need to deal resolutely with "antisocialist" forces seeking to exploit the situation.*

CZECHOSLOVAKIA The Czechoslovak press, in voluminous comment and reportage on the Polish scene, has emphasized the close ties between the workers and the new leaders, the value of self-criticism, the importance of socialist unity, and in the most recent period the Polish regime's own warnings about attempts to create disorders through "demagogic demands."

An "editorial" in Bratislava PRAVDA of 30 December signed by Warsaw correspondent Hulman quoted an admonition by Gierek against "rash concepts in economic policy" and cited the new First Secretary's remarks on the "self-criticism" of his leadership regarding "past mistakes." The same paper on 16 January further manifested approval of the new regime's course in carrying an excerpt from the previous day's issue of the Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU on the need for consultation with the working class and for observing principles of democracy and collective leadership.

A report by Warsaw correspondent Hulman in the 21 January RUDE PRAVO, while reporting the measures taken by Polish trade unions to correct past "errors and shortcomings," added that "TRYBUNA LUDU and GLOS PRACY point out, however, that in some places one can also hear disharmonious and destructive voices" making "demagogic demands" which "weaken discipline." The same emphasis marked a Warsaw dispatch in the 29 January Bratislava PRAVDA entitled "The Solution of Contemporary Problems in Poland in an Atmosphere of Prudence." The dispatch stressed that during their 24-25 January visit to the coastal cities, Gierek and Jaroszewicz not only promised a freer flow of information and other reforms but "also demanded that the people learn to bear responsibility."

* See the TRENDS of 23 December 1970, pages 18-20, for a roundup of earlier East European reactions.

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In the sphere of foreign policy, Czechoslovak media have given heavy publicity to assurances by Gierek and Jaroszewicz that Poland's ties with the USSR and other CEMA and Warsaw Pact countries remain unchanged and to the two leaders' talks with Brezhnev and Kosygin in Moscow on 5 January. An article by Marek in the 14 January issue of the Bratislava youth daily SMENA stressed the need for more such meetings to provide leaders of the socialist countries with more information on the "changes" that took place at the 20 December PZPR plenum.

HUNGARY Budapest is the only one of Moscow's East European allies so far to explicitly, on its own authority, blame the former party leadership for the December Polish events. Thus an article in the Hungarian daily NEPSZABADSAG, entitled "The Old Year in Foreign Politics," contained a brief passage on Poland which attributed the December disturbances "partly" to the old leadership. Two days earlier, MAGYAR NEMZET had quoted a statement by the French CP's Marchais, appearing in L'HUMANITE, to the effect that "omissions have been committed by the old leadership." MAGYAR NEMZET observed that the new leadership is preoccupied with economic problems, and the NEPSZABADSAG article drew a reassuring picture of the international impact of the Polish events: They "do not influence the fundamental trends of development of the socialist community and the development of international relations."

Budapest comment has also sought to play down dangers inherent in the Polish events by ascribing a dominant role to irresponsible--but unrepresentative--juvenile delinquents in the coastal riots. The 7 January NEPSZABADSAG article, pressing this line, emphasized the relative youth of a majority of the coastal shipyard workers as an explanation of why the disturbances broke out in that region. The 14 January issue of the government daily MAGYAR HIRLAP quoted the Warsaw weekly POLITYKA to the effect that during the riots "not a single act or pronouncement was aimed at our socialist system or our international allies."

Currently less frequent, Hungarian comment seems at pains to play down the continued restiveness on the part of Polish workers. A Melykuti article in the 21 January Budapest trade union daily NEPSZAVA pointed to the public

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approval of the Gierek regime and declared that the tenseness and nervousness evident before the new regime took over "was primarily caused by the disruption of relations between the previous party leadership and the masses."

ROMANIA Monitored Bucharest media have carried only one original comment on the Polish developments--an article by Caplescu in the 27 December SCINTEIA emphasizing that the "normal" tempo of activity was being resumed. Although the Bucharest press and radio reported the new leaders' 23 December speeches to the Sejm and carried short items on the communiques on the Polish leaders' visits to the fraternal countries in January, the Romanian reports included no mention of workers' demands for reforms or of the theme of unity among the socialist countries. The dominant feature of the reports was an emphasis on the Polish people's support for the new leaders and their programs.

Bucharest reports on Polish events during the latter part of January have largely steered clear of the internal situation, reporting such international developments as the signing of a five-year Polish-Romanian trade agreement and West German CDU leader Barzel's visit to Warsaw. One of the rare Bucharest reports on the internal Polish scene since mid-January was a 10-line item in the 17 January SCINTEIA which reported the replacement of Loga-Sowinski by Wladyslaw Kruczek as head of Polish trade unions.

BULGARIA Sofia media, originating no comment on the Polish events, have carried almost daily reports generally calculated to stress the continuity of Leninist norms under the new leaders. Only in the latter part of January did Sofia report Polish leaders' statements critical of the former Gomulka regime--along with reports indicating that the situation might be getting out of hand.

RABOTNICHESKO DELO of 25 December, reporting Gierek's and Jaroszewicz's speeches to the Polish Sejm two days earlier, highlighted their assertions that there would be no deviation from socialism, that Poland would remain a firm member of CEMA, and that it would follow an unaltered foreign policy. In the wake of the Polish leaders' visits to Moscow and East Berlin in the first half of January,

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the same paper carried a "TRYBUNA LUDU" editorial--also broadcast in the Sofia domestic service--viewing the visits as confirmation of Poland's firm alliance with the fraternal countries, particularly the USSR.

On 21 January, RABOTNICIESKO DELO carried a report which for the first time in Bulgarian media indicated that "problems" had played a role in the coastal riots. Recounting a visit by Baltic workers' representatives to Gierk and Jaroszewicz in Warsaw, this report noted that after Gierk had explained the causes of the December events, the delegates discussed "the problems which concern the workers and the public of the coastal cities." On the 24th, the same paper reported a letter from Premier Jaroszewicz to enterprise managers in effect complaining that the liberalized situation in the country was getting out of control. The paper said the letter stressed the need for "personal responsibility," which "has not been correctly applied in the past," and pointed out that the 20 December PZPR plenum had created conditions "favoring the overcoming of irregularities and weaknesses."

EAST GERMANY An uneasy reticence has marked the reaction to the Polish events in GDR media, after an initial--18 and 19 December--outburst against the alleged provocative role of RFE and VOA. East Berlin media have since confined their coverage largely to quotations of Polish press comment and to reports of such major developments as the Polish leaders' visits to Moscow and East Berlin in early January. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND on 6 January summarized an article in the Warsaw military paper ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI which scored anew the alleged role of RFE during the December riots. The same issue of the paper reported the approval of both sides of the results of the Polish leaders' talks the previous day in Moscow. An article in the 14 January NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, entitled "New Stage in GDR-Polish Relations," welcomed the results of the Polish leaders' visit to the GDR capital, remarking that "our opponents watched in vain for a negative rift in GDR-Polish relations."

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Since then, the only original comment monitored from GDR sources has been a Franke dispatch from Warsaw, broadcast by Deutschlandsender on 21 January, which highlighted a statement by PZPR Politburo member Szydlak to the effect that "a critical analysis of the errors committed before the December events does not mean that their causes lie in the essence of the socialist order," but rather that "violation of the correct principles of this order" was responsible. The dispatch approvingly cited Szydlak's further statement that "the antisocialist forces trying to benefit from the consequences of the deformation must be countered with determination."

WARSAW MEDIA PUBLICIZE KATOWICE PAPER'S ATTACK ON GOMULKA

Warsaw media have underscored the importance of an article in the 29 January issue of the Katowice daily TRYBUNA ROBOTNICZA which, in advance of the impending eighth PZPR plenum, goes to the greatest lengths so far in attacking Wladyslaw Gomulka in all but name. Although the article has not been reprinted in the main party daily TRYBUNA LUDU, the Warsaw domestic service on the 29th prominently reported in the daily press review that it was reprinted in that day's SLOWO POWSZECHNE, influential daily of the Catholic PAX organization. And PAP on the 29th carried a lengthy summary of the TRYBUNA ROBOTNICZA article.

The author, Chief Editor Szczepanski of the daily organ of the Katowice voivodship party organization, formerly headed by First Secretary Gierek, explicitly assails "the autocratic methods of the former First Secretary." More generally, the article repeatedly attacks "the former party leadership." While stopping short of naming Gomulka, it attacks by name two of Gomulka's closest associates--leading ideologist Kliszko and Jaszczuk, who delivered the plenum report announcing the disastrous price increases--both of whom lost their Politburo posts on 20 December.

While denying that there are plans for "repressions" or "watch-hunts," the article appears to presage an intensified attack on Gomulka at the upcoming PZPR plenum: As summarized by PAP, it declares that "the main reason" for the December crisis was "the departure of the former leadership from Leninist norms" in running the party and the country, and it says this thesis "will certainly be developed and thoroughly justified in the resolutions of the eighth plenum."

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On the 27th PAP carried a brief, though detailed, report on the current state of Gomulka's health. Implying that he has been in the hospital since 19 December, the report said "neuralgic pains . . . have gained in intensity," that "slight disturbances persist," and that "the present state of health requires further treatment."

Gierek had set the tone for the heretofore restrained criticism of the former First Secretary: Thus in his plenum speech on taking office on 20 December, he referred only to "badly thought-out conceptions in economic policy," and in his speech before the Sejm on 23 December he did not go beyond a remark that economic problems "cannot be solved in a bureaucratic manner."

In addition to its unprecedented attack on Gomulka, the TRYBUNA ROBOTNICZA article contains an unprecedented eulogy of Gierek. In leading up to its attack on "the autocratic methods of the former First Secretary," the article recalls that Gierek "courageously" resisted Gomulka's methods even prior to the leadership change. Polish society, it says,

knows and remembers that Edward Gierek, having in view the real needs of the working people and the necessary conditions of harmonious development of the whole country, systematically held a courageous party discussion with members of the former leading group, that he always tried to present in the forum of the former party leadership necessary decisions resulting from the most important needs of the economy and society.

Since the leadership change, Szczepanski continues, "the reintroduction of Leninist methods of party life has started from the top level," and "statutory functions, powers, and duties have been restored to the Secretariat of the Central Committee, the Politburo, and the Central Committee itself." In the requisite criticism and self-criticism at all party levels, he declares, "we have a basic trump card, that is, the confidence and support Edward Gierek enjoys among all party members and the working class." He adds: "We must enrich and strengthen this confidence and support for Edward Gierek."

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T A I W A N

NCNA CARRIES ACCOUNTS OF RESISTANCE TO "U.S.-CHIANG" RULE

NCNA's international service on 25, 26, and 31 January carried reports on resistance in Taiwan against the "U.S.-Chiang" rule and intensifying security measures to defend this "precarious" rule. NCNA's 25 January report told of repeated attacks on U.S. personnel and installations and of opposition to U.S. and Japanese economic penetration. The report on the 26th portrayed "fascist terror and persecution of Taiwan compatriots" at a time when Chiang's regime is faced with its worst crisis since fleeing to Taiwan. On the 31st NCNA summarized a North Korean commentary denouncing the United States for its "protracted occupation" of Taiwan, praising "the Taiwan people's struggle," and predicting that the "700 million Chinese people will surely liberate Taiwan."

Though these themes are not unusual in broadcasts to Taiwan over the PLA's Fukien Front radio, NCNA has only infrequently carried reports of this nature. The last previous such report by NCNA appeared on 29 June 1970 as part of the considerable propaganda marking the 20th anniversary of the U.S. "occupation" of Taiwan. That report dealt with instances of popular resistance to the Chiang regime and the U.S. presence. There had been an earlier spate of NCNA reports along these lines about a year ago: On 20 January 1970 NCNA carried an account of popular discontent among the islanders in the same transmission that reported on the session of the Sino-U.S. talks in Warsaw that day; two subsequent reports depicted miseries suffered by Taiwan miners and peasants, and NCNA on 5 February described worsening economic conditions in Taiwan.

A clue to the timing of the reports in January and February 1970 may have been contained in the 5 February item's reference to the approaching spring festival, which began on 6 February last year. The current reports may have been timed for the same occasion, beginning this year on 27 January. As is customary in connection with major holidays, NCNA announced on 25 January that the Fukien Front units had been ordered to suspend their alternate-day shelling of the offshore islands "as an expression of solicitude" on the lunar new year.

A sustained international dissemination of this kind of propaganda would presumably be intended to underscore Peking's claim to Taiwan

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at a time when the China recognition and representation questions have again become matters of moment. Repetition of themes contained in the recent NCNA reports would serve this end in seeking to show that the Taiwan people themselves are victims of current arrangements. A particularly topical note was struck in the 25 January report's warning against a growing Japanese economic presence. Peking has evinced particular concern over Japan's future role in resolving the Taiwan question and, more generally, over sentiment in the world community inclined toward a "one China, one Taiwan" solution.

The latter concern has been expressed in Peking's comment on the establishment of diplomatic relations with five countries in recent months; in three of these cases (Canada, Italy, and Chile), Peking accepted the compromise formula permitting the other side merely to "take note" of Peking's claim to Taiwan without endorsing it. Unlike Peking's comment in the cases of Canada and Italy, however, its comment following the establishment of diplomatic relations with Chile--announced on 5 January--ignored the Taiwan question while expressing gratitude to Chile for having voted for the PRC's representation in the United Nations.

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CHEKIANG PROVINCE FORMS PARTY COMMITTEE, EIGHTH IN NATION

Announcing the eighth provincial party committee within 8 weeks, NCNA on 30 January reported the formation of a new committee for Chekiang Province. The NCNA announcement, coming 9 days after the Chekiang provincial radio on 21 January ebulliently reviewed party building progress throughout the province, reported that a congress held in Hangchow from 20 to 28 January elected 67 members and 22 alternates to the new committee.

As in the case of the other provincial committees, the Chekiang committee was formed on the basis of the "three-in-one alliance" of old, middle-aged, and young. It will be headed by six secretaries, smaller than the former 16-man secretariat. Figures on the total size of the previous committee are unavailable.

Following the pattern set in the other rebuilt provincial party committees, the Chekiang committee will be led by men already entrenched within the provincial power hierarchy. New party labels went to: Nan Ping, chairman of the provincial revolutionary committee and acting political commissar of the Chekiang Military District (MD), who was named first secretary and also identified for the first time as head of the party nucleus group. Chen Li-yun, first vice chairman and veteran military figure with responsibilities on the Chekiang MD, was named secretary as was Hsiung Ying-tang, vice chairman and the acting commander of the Chekiang MD. Veteran cadres are represented on the new committee by Lai Ko-ko, vice chairman and former secretary general on the old party committee, who was named deputy secretary. Hsieh Cheng-hao, vice chairman and a naval officer, was also named a deputy secretary, as was Chai Chi-kun, chairman of the Ningpo Special District revolutionary committee in Chekiang and the only subprovincial powerholder on the new committee.

This latest announcement indirectly highlights once again the political health of Politburo members Hsu Shih-yu and Chang Chun-chiao--both recently named first secretaries on new party committees set up in their respective provincial bailiwicks. Hsu and Chang have managed to make the Nanking Military Region (MR), which they head, the first MR to rebuild all the

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provincial-level party units within its jurisdiction. And this notwithstanding the fact that the Nanking MR has more such units to deal with than any other MR except Peking.

OTHER COMMITTEES Commenting for the first time on the fact
IN THE OFFING that "a number of provinces" have recently
 elected new provincial party committees,
a 30 January PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial, the first on a domestic issue since 30 October, called the new committees significant advances for "strengthening the centralized leadership of the party." Confidently declaring that "other provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions are in active preparation," the editorial went on to caution party members at all levels against arrogance and rashness in working to greet the 50th anniversary of the CCP "with new victories."

LEADERSHIP PROBLEMS PERSIST DESPITE PARTY COMMITTEE RESURGENCE

Recent provincial newspaper articles make it clear that the formation of party committees in many areas does not mean the end of ideological struggle. A KWANGSI DAILY editorial broadcast on 27 January noted that serious questions regarding cadre behavior "are cropping up in the new leading groups." A TACHUNG DAILY editorial broadcast on the 24th stated that in the key area of educational reform "a struggle is still being waged in some areas and among some units."

In the realm of PLA-civilian cadre relations also, problems continue to emerge. Kunming radio on 27 January pointed out that some PLA personnel had "overcriticized the shortcomings of the civilian cadres" without helping them politically. A Hupeh article on the 26th called some of the PLA cadres in civilian posts "arrogant and unwilling to learn from the local cadres."

While these articles point to tensions over current political developments, they offer little in the way of specifying the issues now causing turmoil. One of the few items to point out a specific policy now under discussion was a 21 January FUKIEN DAILY editorial dealing with cadre decisions for the coming year. In a section on agriculture, the editorial reemphasized the need for even greater efforts in grain production, but acknowledged opposition to this scheme of priorities--which has now been pressed for several years running with presumed

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deleterious effect on other crops. Coming close to an outright admission that other crops did suffer last year, the editorial attacked the idea that "last year too much work was done on grain production, causing an adverse effect on the sideline production." But it did not deny that such production was down.

Both the FUKIEN DAILY editorial cited above and a HONAN DAILY editorial broadcast on the 25th stress that the overriding consideration in local decision-making must be the will of the center. The Honan editorial bluntly points out that inevitably "once a task is proposed, there is bound to be a struggle." Cadres must be prepared when this occurs to grasp new trends; they must not assume that because they "were right at one stage they are always right" (which sounds like a slap at "revolutionaries" who jumped correctly in 1967, but who must now learn that discipline has been restored). Echoing a slogan from the cultural revolution, the editorial warns that instructions must be followed whether or not they are understood; but in line with current efforts at cadre education it adds that cadres must "strive to understand [orders] fully in the course of carrying them out."

While the Honan editorial points at "class enemies" who are "applying still more sinister and tricky methods" as the cause of many current problems, the Fukien editorial less conspiratorially attributes most problems to a lack of organizational discipline. Some cadres are said to have passively fallen behind, fearing dangers so much that they "dare not do anything new," not even emulating models "which other people have already done." But even those who actively evade central desires are apparently not to be automatically expelled from the ranks of "the people" in Fukien. Spreading "fabricated rumors" and "taking the evil road" are characterized as "grave mistakes," yet they are said to "manifest nothing but a lack of organizational discipline."

The Fukien editorial treads more sensitive ground with an unusually effusive paean of praise to Lin Piao. Besides giving Lin his customary status as Mao's best pupil, the editorial makes the more unusual claim that Lin is capable of his own philosophical thoughts and "has in a deepgoing manner elaborated Mao Tsetung Thought in all fields, including ideological, political, philosophical, and military fields."

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USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

REGIME SUSPENDS PUBLICATION OF STALIN-ERA HISTORY

The Soviet leadership appears again to be confronted urgently with the "Stalin problem." As the most recent sign of this confrontation, a major work in the multivolume official party history has failed to appear on schedule. The work in question--Book 2, Volume 4 of "The History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union"--deals with the most sordid period of Stalin's reign (1929-37), the era of the collectivization of agriculture, the assassination of Kirov, and the launching of the great terror. In view of the scope of the historical study, the delay in publication would appear to be related to unresolved differences in the leadership over the Stalin issue.

It is also possible, however, that the delay represents a calculated effort to withhold authoritative assessment of Stalin until the dust settles in the political arena. In that case, the 24th CPSU Congress, scheduled to convene on 30 March, could conceivably serve as the forum for a major reassessment of Stalin, as has been rumored in the Western press in recent months. The thrust of any such reassessment may be gauged by the more favorable image of Stalin that has emerged in the propaganda in recent years.

OFFICIAL SILENCE Although there has been no official announcement of any interruption in the publication schedule of the multivolume party history, the record clearly indicates such an interruption has occurred. The first three volumes in the series appeared at regular intervals during 1965-67, but Book 1, Volume 4 (covering the 1921-29 period) did not appear until last spring. Its publication was announced in PRAVDA on 13 May; it was subsequently advertised in various party journals; and it was favorably reviewed in PRAVDA on 25 July. (As in the earlier works in the series, which were addressed to the less critical years of Stalin's career, the new work contained numerous factual, though largely uncritical, references to Stalin.)

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If the earlier publication schedule had been met, the companion piece to the first book of Volume 4 should have appeared no later than the end of last year. However, there has been no sign of the work and no mention of it in the party press. Instead, on 26 January PRAVDA announced the publication of another volume in the series--Book 1, Volume 5 (covering the 1938-45 period).

The fate of the missing historical work is reminiscent of that experienced by Volume 40 of "The Large Soviet Encyclopedia" in the Khrushchev era. Volume 40, which contained the authoritative biography of Stalin, appeared in early 1958 after a delay of over 18 months, during which all the subsequent alphabetical volumes in the encyclopedia had appeared in print. The delay was undoubtedly caused by differences in the leadership over the Stalin issue, which were temporarily resolved by the purge of the so-called antiparty group in mid-1957.

CAUTION ON The persistence of such differences may be
STALIN inferred by the circumspect handling of the
 Stalin issue by Khrushchev's successors.

Instead of undertaking a forthright reappraisal that might provoke public outcries at home and abroad, the post-Khrushchev regime, out of concern over the consolidation of its authority, decided to sanction an indirect approach aimed more at extolling the "heroic" past than at rehabilitating Stalin. In the process, however, Stalin has been an important--if not the principal--beneficiary of this campaign.

The detailed and sensational criticisms of Stalin voiced at the 22nd CPSU Congress in 1961 and recorded in the second edition of the one-volume party history in 1962 have gradually given way to the muted and stereotyped formulations of the June 1956 CPSU Central Committee decree on the "personality cult." At the same time, the outpouring of military memoirs and literary and historical works on the war during the past few years has served to obliterate the strictures of the Khrushchev era and restore a large measure of Stalin's reputation as a war leader.

Stalin's credentials as a political leader, however, remain in question. And the element of uncertainty on this matter, which in one way or another touches on other vital aspects of Soviet state and society, is not likely to be lessened by the recent decision to suspend judgment on the most sordid period of Stalin's reign.

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KOMMUNIST ARTICLE URGES STRONG LEADER FOR COLLECTIVE

The need for a strong leader in the institutions of power is argued by A. Pershin in the first issue of KOMMUNIST for 1971. The appearance of the article, entitled "The Authority of a leader," coincides with other efforts to raise Brezhnev's stature--most recently, the publication in PRAVDA on 20 January of a local leader's designation of him as head of the Politburo.

Articles that are pro-collectivity continue to be published also, however, and there are indications that some party organizations continue to resist the attempts to exalt Brezhnev. Unlike other republican papers, the Georgian and Belorussian newspapers deleted from the TASS report (published in PRAVDA) the reference to Brezhnev as head of the Politburo.

In his KOMMUNIST article Pershin affirms that "no matter what sphere of public life we consider, any organization is unthinkable without authority, without a dominating will, embodied either in one person or in a collective organ." In this respect he contradicts the view of Vice Admiral I. Rudnev, chief of the political administration of the Black Sea Fleet, in RED STAR on 12 January: "Collegiality in working out party policy and in adopting decisions in the CPSU is assured by the fact that it is not individual persons or one-man leaders which stand at the head of party organizations, but collective organs--bureaus and committees." Another admiral, P. Ushakov, writing in a January issue of COMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES (No. 1), also reasserted the principle of collectivity, arguing that no leader "no matter how capable" can replace the collective. A January PARTY LIFE (No. 2) article by S. Smirnov on Leninist principles and norms likewise urged "further development of intra-party democracy" and "strengthening of the principle of collective leadership," and called for "undeviating observance" of principles and norms of party life.

Pershin's article tends to subordinate the principle of collectivity to the need for a strong leader:

Relying on the masses and collegiality in discussing basic problems in no way reduces the role of the administrative functions of the leader, his one-man

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responsibility and one-man management--without this there would be no preciseness or efficiency of leadership. Lenin, while defending collectivity and collegiality in administration, more than once also warned against extremes, turning collegial organs into talk shops.

According to Pershin, Lenin asserted that "final decisions belong to one leader--'to one comrade, known for his firmness, decisiveness, boldness, ability to conduct practical work and enjoying the most confidence.' In all cases without exception democracy in leadership and collegiality must be combined with the authority of an administrator, with the personal responsibility of a leader." Pershin also quotes Lenin on the need for "unquestioned obedience to the will of one person, a Soviet leader, during work." He does, however, caution that if a leader "acts against the interests of the collective, does not meet the demands of life and does not consider real conditions," the party corrects him and, if necessary, can even replace him.

BACKGROUND The role of the leader vis-a-vis the collective has been the subject of continuing debate in recent years. After a concentrated surge of pro-collectivity articles in January-February 1969 (the last of which--G. I. Shitarev's in QUESTIONS OF CPSU HISTORY, No. 3--recalled that the October 1964 plenum had acted "against attempts to replace collective decisions with one-man actions"), sporadic attempts have been made to boost the role of the individual leader. In April 1969--the month in which Kunayev first used the formulation "Politburo headed by Brezhnev"--V. Chumichev wrote in POLITICAL SELF-EDUCATION that collectivity "includes the recognition of the role and responsibility of a leader" and requires rejection of "anarchic views negating the role of leaders and organizers of the masses." He went on: "To the same degree that collectivity is needed, stressed Vladimir Ilich, one-man management is needed so that there will not be irresponsibility in work." This view was repeated by Col. M. Timofeychev in an October COMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES (No. 20, 1969).

Yu. G. Turishchev carried the argument still further in the December 1969 QUESTIONS OF CPSU HISTORY. Using the term "vozhd" (chief) instead of "rukovoditel" (leader), he upheld the need for strong "chiefs of the party, the most experienced and farsighted of its leaders." He

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sought to differentiate such authority from a cult of personality by declaring that under the latter the leader acquired "a supernatural role" which belittled the role of the party and the masses (as under Stalin).

The articles in this vein were implicitly challenged by others. In the June 1969 QUESTIONS OF CPSU HISTORY I. I. Ivanov wrote that "while noting the important role of outstanding persons and leaders, the party resolutely fights glorification of particular leaders." Georgian Second Secretary P. A. Rodionov--whose treatises on collectivity appear more frequently than those by any other author--asserted in PRAVDA on 2 August 1969 that "no one belittles nor can belittle the role of a first secretary. But he can successfully carry out this responsible role only by relying on the collective" V. P. Nikolayeva in the September 1969 QUESTIONS OF CPSU HISTORY, seemingly with Kunayev's April statement in mind, wrote: "It is well known that Lenin categorically objected to exaggerations of the role of his person and opposed attributing nonexistent offices to him"--for example, by crossing out the title "chairman of the Politburo." Nevertheless, Kunayev again called Brezhnev head of the Politburo in November 1969.

In early 1970 Rodionov again adopted a more reserved position in the debate. Writing in the April QUESTIONS OF CPSU HISTORY, he duly noted that collectivity did not negate the role of leaders, but his definition of the limits of authority was more restrictive. In his view, a cult involved "superstitious admiration of a particular outstanding person and belittling the role of the masses," while legitimate authority was "based on recognizing the decisive role of the masses, collectivity in work, the community of interests of leaders and followers, and correct, deep understanding of these interests." Rodionov stressed a secretary's subordination to the collective and further noted that collectivity was improved in Lenin's day by expanding the size of the Politburo.

The discussion has appeared to taper off since early 1970, but occasional articles with controversial ideas have continued to appear. Krasnodar First Secretary G. S. Zolotukhin in the August QUESTIONS OF CPSU HISTORY argued that collectivity requires management by the leader of the collective organ and that one-man decisions are not incompatible with democracy. Central Committee cadre section instructor N. Zolotarev in a

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September 1970 KOMMUNIST (No. 13) recalled Lenin's demand that whenever possible "collectivity should be reduced to the shortest discussion of only the most important questions in the smallest collegium, and the practical management of an institution, enterprise, matter or task should be entrusted to one comrade"

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


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